Cabinet's Finest Hour Page 12

  The Prime Minister said that he was quite ready to send such a message, and had already thought of doing so. He would propose to say that, on assuming the office of Prime Minister, he wished to assure Signor Mussolini of his hope that this country and Italy should not be divided by bloodshed; we were finding the war hard, but we were confident of ultimate victory; it would be a disaster of the first magnitude if any irrevocable steps were taken, but, if this should happen, we should have no choice but to pursue the matter to the end, and this we should do. The Prime Minister said that he would draft a message and then consult with the Foreign Secretary.

  The War Cabinet took note:

  (a) Of the statement by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

  (b) That the Prime Minister proposed to send a personal message to Signor Mussolini on the lines indicated in the discussion.

  The Prime Minister then said to the War Cabinet that there remained two important questions to be decided that morning in regard to air operations:

  (1)Whether we should send any more fighter squadrons to France in response to M. Reynaud’s appeal.

  (2)Whether we should attack military objectives in the Ruhr and elsewhere in Germany east of the Rhine.

  As regards the former, he suggested that the War Cabinet would have little difficulty in deciding against the despatch of further fighter squadrons in view of the fact that no demand for these had been received from the military authorities in France.

  The Prime Minister then asked Sir Archibald Sinclair, leader of the Liberal Party and an old friend, who had served under him in WW I in France, and was now Secretary of State for Air, what was his view on the question of an attack against military objectives in the Ruhr and other similar targets. Sinclair warned that the experience of the last few days in France pointed to the fact that, at the present rate of losses, it would be extremely difficult for the Royal Air Force to maintain its present effort in support of the land battle by daylight bombing operations.

  The meeting also minuted an important intervention from the Lord Privy Seal, Clement Attlee, who considered that the moment had arrived when it was essential for Britain’s counter-attack. The proposed attack on the German railways and oil refineries seemed to provide the best and most effective means of carrying this out, and he was accordingly in favour of initiating these operations forthwith.

  The War Cabinet then agreed:

  (1)That no further fighter squadrons should, for the present, be sent to France, and to invite the Prime Minister so to inform M. Reynaud.

  (2)To authorise the Chief of the Air Staff to order Bomber Command to carry out attacks on suitable military objectives (including marshalling yards and oil refineries) in the Ruhr as well as elsewhere in Germany; and that these attacks should begin that night with approximately 100 heavy bombers.

  (3)That the French Government should be informed, through the normal channels, of our intention to carry out these operations.

  On 16 May the War Cabinet met at 11.30 am and records show that the previous day’s decision was changed after a request from the French for additional fighter squadrons had been received.

  The Prime Minister said that an urgent appeal had been received from France for the despatch of additional fighter aircraft. The War Cabinet would have to decide, as a matter of urgency, whether this request should be met. German armoured fighting vehicles appeared to have broken through and reached the area Hirson-Montcornet-Neufchâtel.

  The Prime Minister said that to despatch fighter aircraft from this country, at a time when we were most likely to be attacked ourselves in response to the attacks on military targets in the Ruhr the previous night, was taking a very grave risk, but it seemed essential to do something to bolster up the French. Armoured fighting vehicles could not conquer the whole of France, but there was a danger of their spreading panic behind the lines. The first necessity, therefore, was to support the French morale and give them a chance to recover themselves and deal with German armoured forces by the use of their own army. He favoured withdrawing the two fighter squadrons allocated to the defence of Scapa Flow, and sending six squadrons in all. More than that we could not do. If the fighters were taken away from Scapa Flow the fleet might have to be sent round to the Clyde, but Scapa was heavily defended by anti-aircraft artillery in addition to the ships’ batteries.

  The Prime Minister said that the main reason for the despatch of fighters was to give the French moral support. Provided their ground troops further back put up some opposition against them, it should be possible to deal with German armoured forces in comparatively small numbers. They would surely not be allowed to reach Paris altogether unopposed.

  The War Cabinet agreed:

  (i) That arrangements should be made for the immediate despatch of the equivalent of four fighter squadrons to France.

  (ii) That preparations should be made for the despatch of two additional fighter squadrons, at very short notice, if it was so decided.

  (iii) That a decision whether to send the two additional squadrons to France should be taken in the light of Air Marshal Joubert de la Ferté’s report later in the day.

  (iv) That the French should be informed of the decision at (i) only.

  The Prime Minister flew to France, and while the minutes give an impression of an orderly process, the real chaos of the situation was described by Lt General Sir Harold Redman much later in a letter dated 14 July 1980:

  Mr Churchill quite certainly was the figure, & personality around whom the proceedings revolved [on 16 May 1940]. This was but natural, as he was the head of a visiting delegation, and newly come to power, and aggressively seeking to find out the exact state of affairs – which Reynaud, Gamelin & the others hardly knew themselves.

  The truth of the matter was, that after several months of complete inactivity on the Western Front, the violence & strength of the air attacks & armoured thrusts of the Germans had caught them unprepared; & after the first rude shock, all the French could think of was that air reinforcements, particularly in fighter aircraft, simply must be found & at once, & where could they come from but from Britain, who must stand or fall with France.

  But you will have all of this sized up better than I ever could.

  I can only add that while this meeting was indeed rather crucial, and although it has been dignified with the title of ‘Supreme War Council’, it was in fact just a hurried get-together of principals, called at the instigation of an over-optimistic newly appointed Prime Minister, rightly determined to go & find out for himself, at the chief danger point, the exact state of affairs.

  What a wonderful man he was.

  At 9.00 pm a message came from Churchill in France to the War Cabinet:

  I shall be glad if the Cabinet could meet immediately to consider following. Situation grave in the last degree. Furious German thrust through Sedan finds French Armies ill-grouped many in North, others in Alsace. At least four days required to bring twenty divisions to cover Paris and strike at the flanks of the Bulge, which is now fifty kilometres wide.

  Three armoured divisions with two or three infantry divisions have advanced through gap and large masses hurrying forward behind them. Two great dangers therefore threaten. First that the BEF will be largely left in the air in taking no action to make a difficult disengagement and retreat to the old line. Secondly that the German thrust will wear down the French resistance before it can be fully gathered.

  Orders given to defend Paris at all costs, but archives of the Quai d’Orsay already burning in the garden. I consider the next two three or four days decisive for Paris and probably for the French Army. Therefore the question we must face is whether we can give further aid in fighters above four squadrons for which the French are very grateful and whether a larger part of our long-range heavy bombers should be employed tomorrow and following nights upon the German masses crossing the Meuse and flowing into the Bulge. Even so results cannot be guaranteed; but the French resistance may be broken up as rapidly as that
of Poland unless this battle of the Bulge is won. I personally feel that we should send squadrons of fighters demanded (i.e. six more) tomorrow, and concentrating all available French and British aviation, dominate the air above the Bulge for the next two or three days, not for any local purpose but to give the last chance to the French Army to rally its bravery and strength. It would not be good historically if their requests were denied and their ruin resulted. Also night bombardment by a strong force of heavy bombers can no doubt be arranged. It looks as if the enemy was, by now, fully extended both in the air and tanks. We must not underrate the increasing difficulties of his advance if strongly counter-attacked. I imagine that if all fails here we could still shift what is left of own air striking force to assist the BEF should it be forced to withdraw. I again emphasise the mortal gravity of the hour, and express my opinion as above. Kindly inform me what you will do. Dill agrees. I must have answer by midnight in order to encourage the French. Telephone to Ismay at Embassy in Hindustani.

  What a wonderful way to defeat German intelligence, to rely on Major General Ismay’s service in India and fluency in Hindustani.28

  The War Cabinet met at 11.00 pm under the chairmanship of Neville Chamberlain, an early demonstration of the wisdom of allowing him to take the chair as part of Churchill’s injunction as he left for France to “mind the shop”. What was at issue was how to respond rationally to a very emotional Prime Minister still in France.

  The War Cabinet were informed that of the four squadrons already promised two had left during the day and the other two were leaving at dawn. If six more were sent, we should be down to 29 squadrons in all in the United Kingdom. Everything was being done to make up fighter aircraft received from production with the necessary accessories, which were being stripped from aircraft which had been damaged in action.

  The Chief of the Air Staff said that there would be no difficulty in putting heavy bombers on to the Meuse crossings. The provision of the additional fighter squadrons was more difficult. We had at present seven fighter squadrons operating in the north of France and three in the south, but the latter had moved their bases and were somewhat disorganised. The bases in the north could not receive six more squadrons; three was the most they could take. There remained in the United Kingdom at the present time only six complete Hurricane squadrons. He proposed to move all these down to aerodromes in Kent, and to send servicing parties over to the aerodromes in northern France used by the Air Component. Three of the six squadrons to be sent to Kent would work in France from dawn until noon, and then return to Kent, being relieved by the other three for the afternoon. The effect would be the same as if the whole of the six squadrons were sent to work from French aerodromes, but they would be in less danger of attack on the ground in Kent and the crews would have better facilities for rest. The timings of the move would have to be worked out, and it would not be possible to get them all down to Kent tomorrow, since some squadrons would have to move in from distant parts.

  The War Cabinet instructed the Chief of the Air Staff:

  (a) To put in hand immediate arrangements, on the lines which he had proposed, for making available six Hurricane squadrons for operations in France as early as possible.

  (b) To arrange for heavy bombers to attack the Meuse crossings on the night 17–18 May, and following nights.

  This documented account demonstrates, at a time of peril, the case for orderly process and for keeping to proven procedures. It is to Churchill’s credit that he recognised this, and did not try to impose his will from France, divorced from all the essential background information.

  The fourth key political figure who Churchill already had significant dealings with was the President of the United States. It had started on 3 October 1939 when Churchill, then First Lord of the Admiralty, told the War Cabinet that he had received a personal message of a very friendly character from Franklin Roosevelt, who had stated that he would be glad to receive any personal message which Churchill wished to bring to his notice. He proposed that their exchange of correspondence should take place in sealed envelopes conveyed by diplomatic bag. It was part of the constitutional position of the President that he was Commander in Chief of the United States Navy. Chamberlain agreed they should correspond, and this did indeed continue intermittently in what is now called the “Naval Person” correspondence, superseded by the Former Naval Person correspondence when Churchill became Prime Minister.

  Isolationism was still strong in the US in May 1940. Roosevelt was slowly winning ground amongst his liberal friends and colleagues in developing an understanding of the deadly peril to American security that lurked in the deteriorating world situation. When the war broke out in 1939 Roosevelt had said, “This nation will remain a neutral nation, but I cannot ask that every American remain neutral in thought as well. Even a neutral has the right to take account of facts. Even a neutral cannot be asked to close his mind or his conscience … I hope the United States will keep out of this war. I believe that it will. And I give you assurance and reassurance that every effort of your Government will be directed toward that end.”29 It is also important to recognise that Roosevelt was wary of the imperialist within Winston Churchill, and always on the alert lest Churchill should try and enlist America, and him personally, in perpetuating the British Empire. On the day that Germany attacked the Low Countries, Harry Hopkins, who was Roosevelt’s closest adviser in the White House and who had been very ill for some time, went to the White House for dinner and was persuaded by the President to spend the night – he remained living in the White House for three and a half years.30 He was described as “quick, alert, shrewd, bold and carrying it off with a bright Hell’s bells air …, the inevitable Roosevelt favourite”, and his influence on Roosevelt was a profound one.31 That night Churchill and the President had a brief phone call, but as far as is known no matters of substance were discussed. On 15 May Churchill wrote to President Roosevelt:

  Although I have changed my office, I am sure you would not wish me to discontinue our intimate, private correspondence. As you are no doubt aware, the scene has darkened swiftly. The enemy have a marked preponderance in the air, and their new technique is making a deep impression upon the French. I think myself the battle on land has only just begun, and I should like to see the masses engage. Up to the present, Hitler is working with specialised units in tanks and air. The small countries are simply smashed up, one by one, like matchwood. We must expect, though it is not yet certain, that Mussolini will hurry in to share the loot of civilisation. We expect to be attacked here ourselves, both from the air and by parachute and airborne troops in the near future, and are getting ready for them. If necessary, we shall continue the war alone, and we are not afraid of that. But I trust you realise, Mr President, that the voice and force of the United States may count for nothing if they are withheld too long. You may have a completely subjugated Nazified Europe established with astonishing swiftness, and the weight may be more than we can bear. All I ask now is that you should proclaim non-belligerency, which would mean that you would help us with everything short of actually engaging armed forces. Immediate needs are: First of all, the loan of 40 or 50 of your older destroyers to bridge gap between what we have now and the large new construction we put in hand at the beginning of the war. This time next year we shall have plenty.

  But if in the interval Italy comes in against us with another 100 submarines, we may be strained to breaking point. Secondly, we want several hundred of the latest types of aircraft, of which you are now getting delivery. These can be repaid by those now being constructed in the United States for us. Thirdly, anti-aircraft equipment and ammunition, of which again there will be plenty next year, if we are alive to see it. Fourthly, the fact that our ore supply is being compromised from Sweden, from North Africa, and perhaps from Northern Spain makes it necessary to purchase steel in the United States. This also applies to other materials. We shall go on paying dollars for as long as we can, but I should like to feel reasonably sure t
hat when we can pay no more, you will give us the stuff all the same. Fifthly, we have many reports of possible German parachute or airborne descents in Ireland. The visit of a United States squadron to Irish ports, which might well be prolonged, would be invaluable. Sixthly, I am looking to you to keep that Japanese dog quiet in the Pacific, using Singapore in any way convenient. The details of the material which we have in hand will be communicated to you separately.

  With all good wishes and respect.

  Churchill was well aware that he was skating on ice with such requests, particularly “the loan of 40 or 50 of your oldest destroyers”. He had an American mother and often in years past had travelled to the US. He knew the constitutional impediments facing the President and the formidable political impediments he faced against a mood of mounting isolationism. Yet Churchill felt Britain had to have more destroyers, several hundred warplanes, anti-aircraft guns and steel to survive. An assessment from Robert Sherwood, a close friend of both Harry Hopkins and Franklin Roosevelt, who had access to all the papers of Harry Hopkins and interviewed many people including Churchill on three occasions said: “Roosevelt did not discount these requests and subsequent cabled reports from Churchill were not dismissed as exaggerations. During these weeks when horror was piled upon horror, Roosevelt believed that if Churchill erred at all in his estimates he erred on the side of optimism; but Roosevelt rarely objected to that kind of error.”32. Yet Sherwood was at pains to declare openly, “no one will ever know just what finally went on in Roosevelt’s complex mind to determine his decisions.”33 All Churchill could and did do was to grab his attention by writing frequent and riveting letters. They are every bit as important as War Cabinet decisions in producing increasing US assistance in 1940 and 1941.