Cabinet's Finest Hour Page 14

  Churchill complained in private that over four days Billotte had not given any orders to Gort. General Weygand replied that he had suffered a serious accident and had been replaced by Blanchard.

  The following was finally agreed: 1. The Belgian army would move back, to be in line with the Yser and would maintain that position – with the river locks open. 2. The British and French armies would attack with approximately eight divisions in the direction of Bapaume and Cambrai after having reached their closest position – without doubt the following day. 3. As the battle was vital for both armies, and British communications depended on the liberation of Amiens, the Royal Air Force would provide all possible support both day and night for the duration of the battle. 4. The new French army group, which was advancing towards Amiens and forming a line along the Somme would move northwards and link up with the British forces who were attacking southwards in the general direction of Bapaume.

  At 5.00 pm, General Weygand came to see M. Paul Reynaud to give him details on a map of the offensive. At my prompting the President advised him that secrecy surrounding the operation had not been good enough. At the end of the meeting Weygand stated that Frère’s army would be able to engage more personnel than he had envisaged that morning. 42

  Churchill arrived back from Paris at about 6.30 pm that evening and the War Cabinet met at 7.30 pm. The Prime Minister gave his account of his visit to France with the Vice Chiefs of Staff and General Ismay. He had first seen M. Reynaud. He had gathered that former Prime Minister M. Daladier was considerably shaken by the serious defects which had been disclosed in the French military machine, particularly in view of the fact that he had been Minister for War for the past four years. The party had then gone on to see General Weygand, who had made a most favourable impression by his vigour and confidence. General Weygand had given them his full appreciation of the situation, and it was clear that his views coincided exactly with those expounded by the Chief of the Imperial General Staff to the War Cabinet. During Weygand’s visit to the armies in the north on the previous day, the Belgians had agreed to withdraw to the line of the Yser. General Weygand had issued orders for the sluices in that area to be opened in order to cover the Belgian front.

  The War Cabinet met again the following day, 23 May at 7.00 pm. The Prime Minister said that he had been giving further consideration to the observations made by Attlee, the Lord Privy Seal, that morning on the danger of falling between two stools, and that it might be best for the BEF to fall back on the Channel Ports. Churchill had spoken to M. Reynaud and had told him that the position of the BEF was very difficult. M. Reynaud had replied that the French operations were continuing.43 He had then spoken to General Weygand at 6.00 pm and General Weygand had also had a conversation with the Chief of the Imperial General Staff. The gist of the latter conversation had been summarised by the Chief of the Imperial General Staff as follows:

  (1)He (General Weygand) had taken Amiens, Albert and Péronne, and the manoeuvre was continuing under good conditions.

  (2)He considered that the only solution was to continue the manoeuvre. The rest was disaster.

  (3)He was quite unmoved when I told him of the weight of the forces moving up on the line Béthune–St-Omer. He said that the German Armoured Division were reduced by casualties.

  (4)He talked of studying the question of feeding Blanchard from the sea. I told him that we knew the difficulties and had little chance of doing much.

  (5)Weygand was confident.

  General Weygand had demanded that the operation should continue. The Chief of the Imperial General Staff and the Vice Chief of the Imperial General Staff had both been of the view that it was better that the operation should continue, since, if the BEF were to retire on the Channel ports, it was unlikely that more than a small part of the force could be got away.

  In France Lt.-Col. de Villelume’s diary for 23 May reads:

  Thursday 23 May

  At 16.00, General Weygand informed Baudouin in that he was very satisfied at the way operations had proceeded since the morning. He added that our troops had reached Amiens. Less than half an hour later, Churchill phoned Paul Reynaud to advise him that, as there had been no news of General Blanchard and in view of the position of the German armoured divisions, he wondered if it would not be better for the British troops to retreat to the Channel ports. The President replied that Weygand was satisfied with the situation and that we must not change our plans. “We must go on”.44

  In King George VI’s diary the following entry appears for that same day, 23 May, written that evening:

  The Prime Minister came at 10.30 pm. He told me that if the French plan made out by Weygand did not come off, he would have to order the BEF back to England. This operation would mean the loss of all guns, tanks, ammunition, & all stores in France. The question was whether we could get the troops back from Calais & Dunkirk. The very thought of having to order this movement is appalling, as the loss of life will probably be immense.45

  A historical reminder of the danger of Britain threatening to withdraw from World War I came from Lt.-Col. de Villelume’s entry in his diary for 24 May:

  At 9.15, Paul Reynaud received Campbell.46 He arrived to comment on a letter by Churchill, which at 3.00 am he had passed on to the duty officer. In it, the Prime Minister complained that Gort had not received any orders from the French High Command. He then mentioned the necessity of defending the Channel ports. In front of the President, I reminded the ambassador of the demand for a withdrawal expressed by the French in August 1914 – both were unaware of this historical point. I strived to convince him that if that had been put into effect it would have led to our defeat.

  At 11.30, the 4th Bureau of the Ministry of the Navy and the Director of Le Havre Industrial Oil Company advised me that the British were evacuating heavy units from their base in the port. The result was that panic seized the local population of the Seine-Inférieure department, leading to mass evacuation. I immediately sent forceful instructions via Mandel to the “préfet” (TN) of Rouen and the vice “préfet” of Le Havre.

  The War Cabinet met in London on 24 May at 11.30 am. The minutes47 read with particular poignancy since my father in the BEF left Boulogne the day before, sailing through the night and arriving in Plymouth Sound. With only the clothes he had on, he knocked on the door of our house in Plymouth for it to be opened by my mother.

  I was just under two years old.

  BOULOGNE

  (1)The Prime Minister said that Boulogne had been evacuated on the previous night. 1,000 had been got away, but 200 had been left behind.

  (2)Our destroyers taking part in the operations at Boulogne the previous day had suffered a certain amount of damage from bombing, and machine-gun and battery fire. They had been fired at by some twenty German field-guns north of the harbour. The destroyers had replied, and believed they had succeeded in putting seven of these guns out of action.

  CALAIS

  (3)We had the following troops in Calais:-

  1Tank Regiment, including cruiser and light tanks;

  2Rifle Battalions, the majority of whose equipment had now been landed; and

  1Battalion of Queen Victoria Rifles.

  These were holding a position through the town, which was being shelled. The tanks had had an engagement with German tanks on the previous afternoon which had resulted in a stalemate. Their instructions had been to try to clear the forward roads, but this they had been unable to do, and in consequence the food convoy from Calais had failed to get through to St-Omer.

  (4)As regards the Naval 12-pounder guns which were being prepared for use at Calais, the First Lord of the Admiralty said that mountings were being improvised, and that all possible steps were being taken to accelerate the necessary work. It was hoped to have six of the guns ready by the following afternoon, i.e., they might reach Calais in the evening.

  DUNKIRK

  (5)Considerable numbers of French troops were in Dunkirk, but no English troops had as yet be
en sent there, with the exception of certain small units sent back to this area from the BEF. The port was functioning quite well. One supply ship had been unloaded on the previous day. An ammunition ship was due to arrive there that day.

  The Confidential Annex to the War Cabinet minutes of that same meeting read:

  Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Halifax said that just before the meeting he had seen the Belgian Ambassador48 who had been accompanied by a Belgian minister. They had brought an urgent message pointing out that it was imperative that the King of the Belgians should not be captured. They suggested that the situation was such that arrangements should be made, if necessary, to bring him and his staff, comprising 30 or 40 persons, to England that night. Before the King would consent to leave, however, it would be necessary that a message should be sent to him by the British Government. They had suggested that his departure should be made either by boat or plane from Ostend, Nieuport, or Dunkirk. He (the Foreign Secretary) was certainly of the opinion that the King of the Belgians should on no account run the risk of being taken prisoner.

  The Prime Minister considered that such a move would be premature. The Belgian Army was still holding the line of the Scheldt, and it would be regrettable that the King should leave his Army at this stage. When the time came, however, it would be perfectly possible to send a message which would clear the King’s conscience.

  The Chief of the Imperial General Staff Ironside agreed. There was no sign as yet of any break in the Belgian Army, and therefore no grounds for immediate alarm.

  The War Cabinet agreed to invite the Foreign Secretary to inform the Belgian Ambassador that in the opinion of His Majesty’s Government the situation was not yet so critical as to justify the proposed departure of the King of the Belgians, but meanwhile, that close touch would be kept with Sir Roger Keyes, and all arrangements would be made to evacuate the King of the Belgians and his staff at short notice should this become necessary.

  The situation was looking desperate. Churchill wrote to General Ismay:

  VCNS49 informs me that order was sent at 2.00 am to Calais saying that evacuation was decided in principle, but this is surely madness. The only effect of evacuating Calais would be to transfer the forces now blocking it to Dunkirk. Calais must be held for many reasons, but specially to hold the enemy on its front. The Admiralty say they are preparing 24 Naval 12-pounders, which with SAP50 will pierce any tank. Some of these will be ready this evening.

  In a further memo to General Ismay later that day, Churchill wrote very critically of Gort:

  I cannot understand the situation around Calais. The Germans are blocking all exits, and our regiment of tanks is boxed up in the town because it cannot face the field guns planted on the outskirts. Yet I expect the forces achieving this are very modest. Why, then, are they not attacked? Why does not Lord Gort attack them from the rear at the same time that we make a sortie from Calais? Surely Gort can spare a Brigade or two to clear his communications and to secure the supplies vital to his Army. Here is a General with nine Divisions about to be starved out, and yet he cannot send a force to clear his communications. What else can be so important as this? Where could a Reserve be better employed? This force blockading Calais should be attacked at once by Gort, by the Canadians from Dunkirk and by a sortie of our boxedup tanks. Apparently the Germans can go anywhere and do anything, and their tanks can act in twos and threes all over our rear, and even when they are located they are not attacked. Also our tanks recoil before their field guns, but our field guns do not like to take on their tanks. If their motorised artillery, far from its base, can block us, why cannot we, with the artillery of a great Army, block them? Of course if one side fights and the other does not, the war is apt to become somewhat unequal. The responsibility for cleansing the communications with Calais and keeping them open, rests primarily with the BEF.51

  The Defence Committee minutes of the meeting held that day, 24 May, at 5.00 pm read as follows:

  The Chief of the Imperial General Staff read out a message which had just been received to the effect that German tanks had penetrated past the forts on the west side of Calais and had got between the town and the sea. The Brigadier52 was organising his forces on an inner line of defence. He thought that it would be useless to dribble more infantry reinforcements into Calais, since they would not have the weapons with which to deal with the heavy tanks. The brigade which was already there and the tank regiment had been ordered to fight it out in their present positions.

  The Prime Minister agreed that this force must fight it out in the town and endeavour to engage the Germans in street fighting, which they would be very anxious to avoid if possible.53

  What is clear is that there was no reporting to the War Cabinet of any intelligence about Hitler’s visit to his troops that day 15 miles away from Calais (see Chapter 5) where a crucial decision was taken.

  Chamberlain wrote on 25 May 1940 from Downing Street to his sister Ida, what could be described as the case for his defence, and perhaps the self-justification, for him starting to distance himself in the next few days in the War Cabinet from Halifax:

  There is no pleasure in life for us just now. Weekends cannot be distinguished from weekdays: one works through each day wondering what new crisis will arise and only during the hours of sleep is the mind at rest …

  … if we had had to fight in 1938 the results would have been far worse. It would be rash to prophesy the verdict of history, but if full access is obtained to all the records it will be seen that I realised from the beginning our military weakness and did my best to postpone if I could not avert the war. But I had to fight every yard against both Labour & Liberal Opposition leaders who denounced me for trying to maintain good relations with Italy and Japan, for refusing to back Republican Spain against Franco and for not “standing up to Hitler” at each successive act of aggression.

  On that day of 25 May, as Churchill records in Their Finest Hour and as the adverse battle drew to its climax, “I and my colleagues greatly desired that Sir John Dill should become CIGS [Chief of Imperial General Staff]”.54 Late that night Churchill, the present CIGS, General Ironside, Dill and Ismay, met at Admiralty House, and Churchill records that General Ironside volunteered the proposal that he should cease to be CIGS but was ready to take command of British Home Forces. Churchill described it as a “spirited and selfless offer” which he accepted; it was agreed Sir John Dill would become CIGS on 27 May. It was a dramatic change; a clear demonstration of how dire the situation had become and of Churchill’s readiness to take the risk of making this most crucial military command change.

  In France, de Villelume was writing at length that day, of which only a few extracts are included here: 55

  On completion of yesterday’s inspection I had urged General Picquendar56 to do his utmost to find cannons, even outdated ones, which could be used against tanks in the absence of anything better. He told me today that there were only one hundred 75mm units in reserve and that the generalissimo had set them aside for other uses. At my instigation he ordered that an inventory be made on de Bange cannons in all depots in France. He only found 50, which he then made available to GQG (General Headquarters of the French Army)57.

  After I had stirred them into action with some vigour, Army Staff Headquarters will provide General Héring58 with some telephone lines, missiles and motorcycles.

  Mr Banet-Rivet brought me some tables, showing in a more detailed way than Dautrey had done the previous day, the effect on the Army stocks of armaments as well as those of the Navy caused by the invasion of part of the territory.

  The President held a meeting at midday, which included Marshal Pétain, General Weygand, Admiral Darlan, Baudouin and Mandel. General Weygand gave a record of the orders and reports exchanged the previous day between General Blanchard and himself. Whilst this was in progress, Commandant Fauvelle arrived to join the meeting. He was from Staff Headquarters of the North Army Groups. His description of the situation was one of the utm
ost pessimism: one day of bread and one unit of firepower left hence no way of mounting an attack.

  As a result of that meeting, Paul Reynaud sent a telegram at 15.30 to Churchill, quoted in part here:

  The withdrawal of a number of British units from the Arras area towards the Deûle canal led to General Weygand issuing yesterday Friday at 16.00 the following order to General Blanchard “If you consider that British withdrawal from the Arras area makes it impossible for you to carry out your Southern offensive, you must at least ensure that withdrawal is towards the sea thus safeguarding Dunkirk, which is vital for supplies”. 4. At first light this morning, General Blanchard cabled General Weygand, without referring to his message sent at 16.00 the previous day, that acting in liaison with some British Army units he would launch an attack to seize a departure base along the Marquion–Bois de Bourlon–Cambrai line with the intention of prolonging the attack in the general direction of Bapaume during Sunday i.e. the following day. 5. On receipt of the above telegram from General Blanchard, General Weygand replied with the following telegram: “I approve your plan and I am pleased that despite the situation described in my telegram the previous day, you considered that you were in a position to launch an attack. 6. On arrival in Paris at noon General Weygand received a senior commissioned officer from General Blanchard’s staff headquarters, who had left these quarters the previous day at noon. The officer showed him a map with the current positions of the army groups. 7. General Weygand despatched the senior officer back to General Blanchard and cabled him saying that in the difficult situation he faced, of which everyone was aware, only General Blanchard could decide what action to take and that the honour of nations was in his hands”.