Cabinet's Finest Hour Page 16

  (5)The first six Divisions now in this country should be mobilised, i.e., brought to full strength and provided with equipment.

  (6)The stores at Le Havre, Rouen, Rennes, St Nazaire and Nantes, or at least a proportion of them, should be evacuated.

  Documents seen by War Cabinet Ministers

  SPECIAL DISTRIBUTION AND WAR CABINET.

  To: FRANCE.

  Cipher telegram to Sir R. Campbell, (Paris).

  Foreign Office. 24th May, 1940. 7.40 p.m.

  No. 195. DIPP.

  - - - - - - - oOo - - - - - - -

  [Illegible] IMMEDIATE.

  Your telegrams Nos. 241 [of May 21st], 255 and 262 [both of May 23rd. possible approach to Italy].

  The idea now put forward by the French Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs viz. to approach Signor Mussolini through the President of the United States is welcome to His Majesty’s Government, who have themselves been contemplating the possibility of taking action in this sense. His Majesty’s Government would see no objection to an enquiry being addressed to Signor Mussolini on the lines suggested in paragraph 2 of your telegram No. [Illegible], provided that this was done on the President’s own responsibility.

  2. At the same time it would be useful, in the opinion of His Majesty’s Government, if President Roosevelt were to convey to Signor Mussolini the sense of the last two paragraphs of the statement we had in mind to make concerning Italy (see my telegram No. 406 to [Illegible] action on which has been suspended), omitting the question of contraband control which, as Your Excellency knows, is now being dealt with separately in Rome through the Master of the Rolls. In other words, we would suggest that the President might inform Signor Mussolini that “he had reason to believe

  First Meeting of Ministers

  War Cabinet: Confidential Annex

  (Cabinet papers, 65/13)

  26 May 1940 10

  Downing Street

  9 a.m.

  The Prime Minister informed the War Cabinet that the previous night he had received a letter from General Spears, describing an interview he had had with what had been to all intents and purposes a War Council of France, and also a message from M. Reynaud.

  He read these two documents to the War Cabinet.

  The letter from General Spears may be summarised as follows:—

  (i) The suggestion that Lord Gort had fallen back on the 24th May without warning and without orders had been cleared up. General Weygand had apologised with good grace.

  (ii) On the strength of a report brought in from General Blanchard by Commandant Fauvelle,1 General Weygand had been inclined to alter his instructions to General Blanchard in the sense of inviting him to fall back to the Channel harbours, but in view of the fact that he had later information from General Blanchard, he had finally determined to allow General Blanchard to use his own discretion.

  (iii) General Weygand did not consider that attacks to the southward by the Blanchard group of armies could serve any other purpose than to gain breathing space to fall back to a line covering the harbours. (It had been the that the following represented the attitude of the Allied Governments”:-

  That the Allied Governments

  (a)were aware that the Italian Government entertains certain grievances in regard to the Italian position in the Mediterranean.

  (b)were prepared to consider reasonable Italian claims at the end of the war.

  (c)would welcome Italy’s participation at the peace conference with a status equal to that of the belligerents.

  3. This offer would be more attractive to the Italian Government if the United States Government could not only sponsor but guarantee it, and His Majesty’s Government would accordingly suggest that the President should be asked to make the following statement in addition: –

  That the United States Government for their part would be prepared to guarantee the fulfilment of the Allied promise, but that they would only do so – thus ensuring that Italian claims would be dealt with as part of the general settlement of Europe – provided always that in the meantime Italy had not joined in the war against [remainder of page cut off].

  4. Please endeavour to obtain the early concurrence of the French Government in these proposals. So soon as I [Illegible] that they are in agreement, I would propose to telegraph Washington in this sense, and would suggest that the French Government should take similar action.

  Addressed to Paris No. 198 DIPP.

  Repeated to Rome No. 465 and Washington No. 869.

  original intention to try and break through with a force of five French and two British Divisions, but one of the British Divisions had since had to be put into the line between Menin and Ypres to resist a thrust from the East.)

  (iv) There seemed no chance whatever of any French attack from the south across the Somme to disengage the Blanchard group. There were only eight Divisions spread over a very wide front.

  (v) Commandant Fauvelle has been extremely pessimistic. The Blanchard group has lost all their heavy guns; they had no armoured vehicles; and movements were very much hampered by refugees.

  The message from M. Paul Reynaud set out the conclusions which had been reached at the meeting which General Spears had attended. The principal point was that discretion was given to General Blanchard as to his action.

  The Prime Minister also read a telegram received from Sir Roger Keyes relating to the evacuation of the King of the Belgians, which could be summarised as follows:—

  The King was being urged by his Ministers to fly with them, but he was determined not to desert his army at a time when a stern battle was in progress. If the King were to leave, this would inevitably hasten the capitulation of the Belgian Army and endanger the BEF. King Leopold had written to King George VI to explain his motive in remaining with his army and people if the Belgian Army became encircled and the capitulation of the Belgian Army became inevitable.

  The Prime Minister said that the above communications and other information which had been received had been considered at a meeting the previous night of the Service Ministers and Chiefs of Staff. General Karslake, who had seen General Swayne, reported that the latter thought that the French seemed unlikely to take any effective action from the south. M. Reynaud had telegraphed that he was arriving in this country

  THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OF HIS BRITANNIC MAJESTY’S GOVERNMENT

  Printed for the War Cabinet. May 1940.

  MOST SECRET.

  Copy No. 33

  W.P. (40) 168.

  (Also C.O.C. (40) 390.)

  May 25, 1940.

  TO BE KEPT UNDER LOCK AND KEY.

  It is requested that special care may be taken to ensure the secrecy of this document.

  WAR CABINET.

  ________

  BRITISH STRATEGY IN A CERTAIN EVENTUALITY.

  ____________________

  REPORT BY THE CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE.

  THE object of this paper is to investigate the means whereby we could continue to fight single-handed if French resistance were to collapse completely, involving the loss of a substantial proportion of the British Expeditionary Force, and the French Government were to make terms with Germany. The assumptions we have made are contained in Appendix A of the Annex. Of these the two most important are that:-

  (i) United States of America is willing to give us full economic and financial support, without which we do not think we could continue the war with any chance of success.

  (ii) Italy has intervened against us.

  2. In particular we have asked ourselves two questions:-

  that day and wished to meet the Prime Minister alone, or perhaps with one other Minister present only. It seemed from all the evidence available that we might have to face a situation in which the French were going to collapse, and that we must do our best to extricate the British Expeditionary Force from northern France.

  The Prime Minister read to the War Cabinet the conclusions which had been reached at the meeting of Ministers and Chi
efs of Staff the previous night. On the basis of these conclusions a telegram had been despatched to Lord Gort, warning him that he might be faced with a situation in which the safety of the British Expeditionary Force would be the predominant consideration, and that every endeavour would be made to provide ships for the evacuation, and aircraft to cover it. Preliminary plans were accordingly to be prepared at once.

  The Prime Minister expressed the opinion that, although we could not foresee the outcome of the battle, there was a good chance of getting off a considerable proportion of the British Expeditionary Force. We must, however, be prepared for M. Reynaud in his interview that day to say that the French could not carry on the fight. He would make every endeavour to induce M. Reynaud to carry on, and he would point out that they were at least in honour bound required to provide, as far as lay in their power, for the safe withdrawal of the British Expeditionary Force. He asked the War Cabinet to be ready to meet again at 2 p.m. to receive his report of his discussions with M. Reynaud. He hoped that M. Reynaud would be willing to meet the War Cabinet. There was some indication that M. Reynaud might bring with him a military expert, in which case the discussions might be extended in their scope.

  In order to be prepared to meet all eventualities he had asked the Chiefs of Staff to consider the situation which would arise if the French did drop out of the war, on the following terms of reference:—

  ’In the event of France being unable to continue in the war and becoming neutral, with the Germans

  (a)Could the United Kingdom hold out until assistance from the Empire and America made itself felt? And

  (b)Could we ultimately bring sufficient economic pressure to bear on Germany to ensure her defeat?

  We summarise our conclusions and recommendations below. As regards the latter there are a large number of measures which we consider should be carried out at once irrespective of whether a French collapse is or is not likely.

  We attach our detailed appreciation as an Annex.

  CONCLUSIONS.

  3. There are three ways in which Germany might break down the resistance of the United Kingdom – unrestricted air attack aimed at breaking public morale, starvation of the country by attack on shipping and ports, and occupation by invasion.

  Air Factor.

  4.The vital fact is that our ability to avoid defeat will depend on three factors:-

  (a)Whether the morale of our people will withstand the strain of air bombardment;

  (b)Whether it will be possible to import the absolute essential minimum of commodities necessary to sustain life and to keep our war industries in action;

  (c)Our capacity to resist invasion.

  All of these depend primarily on whether our fighter defences will be able to reduce the scale of attack to reasonable bounds. This will necessarily mean the replacement of casualties in personnel and aircraft on a substantial scale. Our capacity to resist invasion may, however, depend also to a great extent on the maintenance of an effective air striking force.

  These factors cannot be assessed with certainty, and it is impossible to say whether or not the United

  holding their present position, and the Belgian army being forced to capitulate after assisting the British Expeditionary Force to reach the coast; in the event of terms being offered to Britain which would place her entirely at the mercy of Germany through disarmament, cession of naval bases in the Orkneys etc.; what are the prospects of our continuing the war alone against Germany and probably Italy. Can the Navy and the Air Force hold out reasonable hopes of preventing serious invasion, and could the forces gathered in this Island cope with raids from the air involving detachments not greater than 10,000 men; it being observed that a prolongation of British resistance might be very dangerous for Germany engaged in holding down the greater part of Europe.’

  The Prime Minister said that peace and security might be achieved under a German domination of Europe. That we could never accept. We must ensure our complete liberty and independence. He was opposed to any negotiations which might lead to a derogation of our rights and power.

  The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs2 suggested that in the last resort we should ask the French to put their factories out of gear.

  The Lord President of the Council3 felt that whatever undertakings of this character we might extract from the French would be worthless, since the terms of peace which the Germans would propose would inevitably prevent their fulfilment.

  The Prime Minister agreed. It was to be expected, moreover, that the Germans would make the terms of any peace offer as attractive as possible to the French, and lay emphasis on the fact that their quarrel was not with France but with England.

  Kingdom could hold out in all circumstances. We think there are good grounds for the belief that the British people will endure the greatest strain, if they realise – as they are beginning to do – that the existence of the Empire is at stake. We must concentrate our energies primarily on the production of fighter aircraft and crews, and the defence of those factories essential to fighter production should have priority. At the same time it is clear that we cannot afford to neglect our bomber force or to expend it on operations that are not of first importance.

  Civil Defence.

  5. As long as the present quasi-peacetime organisation continues, it is unlikely that this country can hold out. The present Home Security Organisation was constituted to deal with air attack only by aircraft operating from bases in Germany; it is not sufficient to grapple with the problems which would arise as a result of a combination of heavy air attack from bases on a semi-circle from Trondheim to Brest, invasion, and internal attack by the “Fifth Column.”

  Land Forces.

  6. Germany has ample forces to invade and occupy this country. Should the enemy succeed in establishing a force, with its vehicles, firmly ashore – the Army in the United Kingdom, which is very short of equipment, has not got the offensive power to drive it out.

  Naval Forces.

  7. Our first naval task is to secure the United Kingdom and its seaborne supplies against naval attack. We have sufficient Naval forces to deal with those that the enemy can bring against us in Home Waters, and we can provide naval security for our seaborne supplies. Our ability to defeat at sea a seaborne attack on this country is dependent on the extent to which our Naval forces can operate in the face of heavy air attack on both ships and bases, and it is of the greatest importance to strengthen our systems of intelligence and

  On 26 May 1940 Churchill lunched with Reynaud at Admiralty House, before going to 10 Downing Street for a further meeting of the War Cabinet.

  Second Meeting of Ministers

  War Cabinet: Confidential Annex

  (Cabinet papers, 65/13)

  26 May 1940

  10 Downing Street

  2 p.m.

  The Prime Minister said that he did not think that M. Reynaud would object to the British Expeditionary Force being ordered to march to the coast, although this matter had not yet been finally settled with him.

  The Prime Minister then gave an account of M. Reynaud’s discussion with him over lunch.

  M. Reynaud had given an exposé of France’s position. Apart from the troops in the Maginot Line, including the fortress troops, the French had 50 divisions between Malmédy and the coast. Against these the Germans could put 150 divisions. The French Ministers had asked General Weygand for his views on the position. They would defend Paris as long as possible, but if Paris was taken they would retire to the south-west. General Weygand had made it clear, however, that the Germans with their superiority of numbers and tanks, could pierce the line and pass through it. While he would obey orders and fight it out as long as he was told to do so, and would be prepared to go down fighting for the honour of the Flag, he did not think that France’s resistance was likely to last very long against a determined German onslaught.

  The French Ministers therefore concluded that, with 50 divisions against 150, it was clear that the war could not
be won on land. On sea we had good fleets which had established a superiority over Germany; but if Germany had command of resources from Brest to reconnaissance to ensure early and accurate warning of enemy intentions is obtained.

  Seaborne Supplies.

  8. We have adequate shipping to meet our requirements, but again the provision of air security is the main problem. We may have to abandon our ports on the South and East Coasts for trade purposes, and our ability to carry on the war will then depend on West Coast ports entirely. These, therefore, must be adequately defended. All unimportant imports must be eliminated. If we can maintain 60 per cent of our present imports we can obtain enough food for the population and raw materials to continue essential armament production.

  Overseas.

  9. On a long-term view, Germany, in concert with Italy, will strive to overthrow our position in Egypt and the Middle East.

  10. The immediate effect of a French collapse would be the loss of naval control in the Western Mediterranean. Italy would be able to concentrate all her strength against Malta, Gibraltar and Egypt. Malta could probably withstand one serious assault. We could continue to use Gibraltar as a naval base until Spain became hostile. Even then Gibraltar should hold out for 60 days.

  11. To contain the Italian Fleet and secure Egypt a capital ship fleet should be based on Alexandria. In due course a heavy scale of attack could be mounted on Egypt from Libya, and we might have to withdraw the Fleet through the Suez Canal to Aden and block the Canal. Preparations to do this should be undertaken as soon as the contingency considered in this paper arises.

  12. The retention of Singapore is very important for economic control, particularly of rubber and tin. To counter Japanese action in the Far East, a fleet, adequately supported by air forces, is necessary at Singapore. It is most improbable that we could send any naval forces there, and reliance would have to be placed upon the United States to safeguard our interests.