Cabinet's Finest Hour Page 17

  Vladivostok it did not look as though the blockade could win the war. It was clear that this country would take a long time to build up a big army, and that we could not make a big effort in 1941 on land.

  This left the Air. If the Germans took Paris they would have the air factories in that neighbourhood, as well as those in Belgium and Holland.

  What of the United States of America? The munitions industry in that country was feeble.

  Where, then, could France look for salvation? Someone had suggested that a further approach should be made to Italy. This would release 10 French divisions. There were said to be a number of people in Italy, such as Grandi4 and Balbo,5 and the like, who thought that to stab France in the back when she was in mortal struggle with Germany was rather too like the action which Russia had taken in regard to Poland.

  If an approach was made to Italy, what sort of terms would Italy ask? Probably the neutralisation of Gibraltar and the Suez Canal, the demilitarisation of Malta, and the limitation of naval forces in the Mediterranean. Some alteration in the status of Tunis would also be asked for, and the Dodecanese would have to be put right. The Prime Minister said that he had not understood what was meant by this.

  Apparently the French suggestion was that the offer of such terms might keep Italy out of the war.

  M. Reynaud realised that the Germans would probably not keep any terms which they agreed to. He had hinted that he himself would not sign peace terms imposed upon France, but that he might be forced to resign, or might feel that he ought to resign.

  The Prime Minister said that he had then put the

  13. We should endeavour to maintain our position in all our overseas possessions.

  Ability to defeat Germany.

  14. Germany might still be defeated by economic pressure, by a combination of air attack on economic objectives in Germany and on German morale and the creation of widespread revolt in her conquered territories.

  15. We are advised in the following sense by the Ministry of Economic Warfare. We cannot emphasise too strongly the importance of substantial accuracy of this forecast, since upon the economic factor depends our only hope of bringing about the downfall of Germany.

  16. In spite of immediate economic gains obtained from her conquests, Germany will still be very short of food, natural fibres, tin, rubber, nickel and cobalt. Above all, even with Roumanian supplies, she will still have insufficient oil.

  17. Given full Pan-American co-operation, we should be able to control all deficiency commodities at source. There will be no neutrals except Japan and Russia.

  18. The effect of a continued denial of overseas supplies to Germany will be:-

  (a)By the winter of 1940–41, widespread shortage of food in many European industrial areas, including parts of Germany.

  (b)By the winter of 1940–41, shortage of oil will force Germany to weaken her military control in Europe.

  (c)By the middle of 1941, Germany will have difficulty in replacing military equipments. A large part of the industrial plant of Europe will stand still, throwing upon the German administration an immense unemployment problem to handle.

  19. Air attacks on Germany’s oil centre will be an important contribution to the enemy’s defeat and to the reduction of the intensity of his air offensive.

  The pressure we could exert by air action will be extremely limited for some time owing to the effects other side of the case, and suggested that as soon as the situation in North-eastern France had been cleared up, the Germans would make no further attacks on the French line and would immediately start attacking this country. M. Reynaud thought that the dream of all Germans was to conquer Paris, and that they would march on Paris.

  The Prime Minister had said that we were not prepared to give in on any account. We would rather go down fighting than be enslaved to Germany. But in any case we were confident that we had a good chance of surviving the German onslaught. France, however, must stay in the war. If only we could stick things out for another three months, the position would be entirely different. He had asked M. Reynaud if any peace terms had been offered to him. M. Reynaud had said “No”, but that they knew they could get an offer if they wanted one. He repeated that General Weygand was prepared to fight on, but could hold out no hope that France had sufficient power of resistance.

  The Prime Minister said that he suggested that the Foreign Secretary should now go over and see M. Reynaud, who was at Admiralty House, and that he himself, the Lord President of the Council and the Lord Privy Seal6 should come over a few minutes later.

  A short further discussion ensued on whether we should make any approach to Italy.

  The Foreign Secretary favoured this course, and thought that the last thing that Signor Mussolini wanted was to see Herr Hitler dominating Europe. He would be anxious, if he could, to persuade Herr Hitler to take a more reasonable attitude.

  The Prime Minister doubted whether anything would come of an approach to Italy, but said that the matter was one which the War Cabinet would have to consider.

  The Minister without Portfolio7 said that if we of the enemy’s attacks and the need to conserve our striking power to deal with the contingency of invasion.

  20. The territories occupied by Germany are likely to prove a fruitful ground for sowing the seeds of revolt, particularly when economic conditions deteriorate.

  21. Finally, we emphasise once more that these conclusions as to our ability to bring the war to a successful conclusion depend entirely upon full Pan-American economic and financial co-operation.

  22. In view of our terms of reference and the speculative nature of the problem, we have not considered whether the Empire can continue the war if the United Kingdom were defeated.

  RECOMMENDATIONS.

  23. The following recommendations were drafted before the Bill conferring on the Government complete power of control over persons and property for the prosecution of the war was passed. We have not had the opportunity of studying the details of this Bill, so some of our recommendations are no doubt covered by its provisions.

  We recommend that the following measures should be carried out NOW, irrespective of events in France. These measures are confined to those which we consider necessary for the security of this country against attack during the critical period that may arise in the next few months:-

  (i) We should do our utmost to persuade the United States of America to provide aircraft, particularly fighters, as soon as possible and in large numbers, including those from stocks now held by the United States Army and Navy.

  (ii) Measures should be taken to ensure the strictest economy in A.A. ammunition expenditure.

  (iii) The most ruthless action should be taken to eliminate any chances of “Fifth Column” activities. Internment of all enemy aliens and all members of subversive organisations, which latter should be proscribed.

  (iv) Alien refugees are a most dangerous source of could maintain the struggle for some further weeks he thought that we could make use of our economic power in regard to raw materials, textiles, and oil. Stocks in Germany were very depleted. In any event, he hoped that France would take steps to see that valuable stocks and manufacturing capacity in France did not fall into German hands.

  The Prime Minister said that he thought the only point to be settled that day was to persuade M. Reynaud that General Weygand should be instructed to issue orders for the BEF to march to the coast. It was important to make sure that the French had no complaint against us on the score that, by cutting our way to the coast, we were letting them down militarily. At the same time it was important that the orders for the march to the coast should be issued as soon as possible. He asked the Secretary of State for War8 to prepare a draft telegram for despatch, which should be brought over to Admiralty House at 3.15 p.m.

  subversive activity. We recommend that the number of refugees admitted to this country should be cut to the minimum and that those admitted should be kept under the closest surveillance.

  (v)
In order to ensure the necessary co-operation between the Civil and Military Authorities, operational control of all Civil Defence Forces, including county and borough police, &c., should be vested in the Ministry of Home Security and exercised through Regional Commissioners.

  (vi) Any evacuation which the Government intends to carry out in emergency should be carried out now. We recommend that a modification of the scheme for reception areas, in view of the dangers of invasion, should be carried out.

  (vii) Immediate steps to be taken to obtain destroyers and M.T.Bs. from the United States of America.

  (viii) Every possible measure should be directed to obtaining the active support of Eire, particularly with a view to the immediate use of Berehaven.

  (ix) Our intelligence system to be strengthened with a view to getting early warning of German preparations for invasion of this country.

  (x) Dispersal of stocks of raw materials to free our West Coast ports to deal with the heavy increase in imports should now be made.

  (xi) So far as is practicable distribution of food reserves throughout the country with a view to meeting the disorganisation of transport which may occur.

  (xii) Bunkering facilities and other arrangements necessary to deal with a heavy volume of merchant shipping in West Coast and Irish ports should be organised.

  (xiii) All unimportant and luxury imports to be cut out.

  (xiv) Finally we consider that the time has come to inform the public of the true dangers that confront us and to educate them on what they are

  Churchill, Neville Chamberlain and Arthur Greenwood left 10 Downing Street for Admiralty House to see Reynaud, who was already with Lord Halifax. After Reynaud had left for France, they continued with their discussion.

  Third Meeting of Ministers

  War Cabinet: Confidential Annex

  (Cabinet papers, 65/13)

  26 May 1940

  Admiralty House

  5 p.m.

  The Prime Minister said that we were in a different position from France. In the first place, we still had powers of resistance and attack, which they had not. In the second place, they would be likely to be offered decent terms by Germany, which we should not. If France could not defend herself, it was better that she should get out of the war rather than that she should drag us into a settlement which involved intolerable terms. There was no limit to the terms which Germany would impose upon us if she had her way. From one point of view, he would rather France was out of the war before she was broken up, and retained the position of a strong neutral whose factories could not be used against us.

  The Lord Privy Seal9 said that Herr Hitler was working to a time-limit, and he had to win by the end of the year.

  The Lord President of the Council10 thought that he would have to win by the beginning of the winter.

  The Lord Privy Seal said that if France now went out of the war, Herr Hitler would be able to turn on us the sooner.

  The Prime Minister said that he hoped that France would hang on. At the same time we must take care not required to do and what NOT to do, if the country is invaded.

  (Signed)

  C.L.N. NEWALL.

  DUDLEY POUND.

  A. E. PERCIVAL,

  A.C.I.G.S (for C.I.G.S.).

  Richmond Terrace, S.W.1

  to be forced into a weak position in which we went to Signor Mussolini and invited him to go to Herr Hitler and ask him to treat us nicely. We must not get tangled in a position of that kind before we had been involved in any serious fighting.

  The Foreign Secretary11 said that he did not disagree with this view, but that he attached perhaps rather more importance than the Prime Minister to the desirability of allowing France to try out the possibilities of European equilibrium. He was not quite convinced that the Prime Minister’s diagnosis was correct and that it was in Herr Hitler’s interest to insist on outrageous terms. After all, he knew his own internal weaknesses. On this lay-out it might be possible to save France from the wreck. He would not like to see France subjected to the Gestapo.

  The Prime Minister did not think that Germany was likely to attempt this in regard to France.

  The Foreign Secretary said that he was not so sure.

  The Prime Minister had said that it was undesirable that France should be in a position to say that we had stood between her and a tolerable settlement.

  He referred to the Prime Minister’s statement that we might be better off without France. That meant, provided we could obtain safeguards on particular points. This was certainly a point of view which deserved serious consideration.

  The Prime Minister thought that it was best to decide nothing until we saw how much of the Army we could re-embark from France. The operation might be a great failure. On the other hand, our troops might well fight magnificently, and we might save a considerable portion of the Force. A good deal of the re-embarkation would be carried out by day. This would afford a real test of air superiority, since the Germans would attempt to bomb the ships and boats.

  The Prime Minister said that his general comment on the suggested approach to Signor Mussolini was that it implied that if we were prepared to give Germany back her colonies and to make certain concessions in the

  Foreign Office.

  May 25th, 1940.

  Sir,

  I asked the Italian Ambassador to call this afternoon.

  2. I told His Excellency that I wished to speak to him because I had reason to think that a misunderstanding had arisen with regard to the possibility of some statement being made by His Majesty’s Government about the political issues between our two countries. It was quite true that we had intended to make and approach, in appropriate form, to certain political questions, following on the approach which we had made to questions concerning contraband control; and in any such approach we should have wished to make plain our desire that Italy should naturally take her proper place at a peace conference by the side of the belligerents. I had, however, hesitated to make the approach in question because of the discouraging nature of the reply which Signor Mussolini had sent through Count Ciano to a personal communication from the Prime Minister, which had led me to doubt whether any useful purpose would be served by our trying to define our position more closely to the Italian Government. In view, however, of the misunderstanding which seemed to have arisen, I wished to take the opportunity of saying that while we fully recognised the special relations in which Italy stood to Germany, we had always been quite willing to discuss any questions between our two countries and to endeavour to reach solutions satisfactory to both sides. His Majesty’s Government would be willing at any time to propose such a discussion to the Italian Government if we could have some assurance that we should not be rebuffed. If and when we should ever receive an indication that our approach might be received with due consideration, we should be prepared to carry the matter further and deal with it in greater detail. Personally I should hope, and I felt sure that this would be the view of His Majesty’s Government, that the measure of success which we were Mediterranean, it was possible for us to get out of our present difficulties. He thought that no such option was open to us. For example, the terms offered would certainly prevent us from completing our re-armament.

  The Foreign Secretary said that, if so, the terms would be refused, but he felt sure that Signor Mussolini must feel in a most uncomfortable position.

  The Prime Minister said that Herr Hitler thought that he had the whip hand. The only thing to do was to show him that he could not conquer this country. If, on M. Reynaud’s showing, France could not continue, we must part company. At the same time, he did not raise objection to some approach being made to Signor Mussolini.

  During the latter part of this discussion the Prime Minister was called out of the room to speak to Sir Roger Keyes, who had a message from the King of the Belgians. The King was determined to stay with his Army. There was, perhaps, a chance that he might be persuaded to leave at the last minute. The Belgians were determined
to act as the left flank to assist our re-embarkation. Sir Roger Keyes said there was still nothing in Ostend to prevent it being taken. The Menin Gate 'was being shelled that afternoon'.12 He had been at Lord Gort’s headquarters when orders had come to march to the coast. It was clear that these orders had been received with acclamation at GHQ, where it was held that the march to the South held out no prospect of success.

  The Lord President of the Council13 asked what information should be given to the Dominions.

  The Prime Minister thought that nothing should be said to them in regard to the discussions with M. Reynaud. At the same time, they should be told that we had now obtained the formal assent of the French Government to falling back on the coast, and that the position was a serious one.

  in the way of achieving as regards the difficulties connected with contraband control might serve to open the way to the treatment of other questions, always provided that we could approach these questions on the basis of the frankest recognition of the rights and necessities of both parties.

  3. I told His Excellency that I had thought that I ought to give him this message in order that I might feel, and perhaps His Excellency also, that, so far as we were concerned, nothing had been left undone that could help to avoid any misunderstanding, or something worse, between our two countries.

  4. Signor Bastianini thanked me very much for my communication. He said that he had no knowledge of the exchange of letters between Signor Mussolini and the Prime Minister, but that he would of course immediately pass on what I had said to his Government. It had, however, always been Signor Mussolini’s view that the settlement of problems between Italy and any other country should be part of a general European settlement, and His Excellency asked me whether he might inform his Government that His Majesty’s Government considered it opportune now to examine the questions at issue between our two countries within the larger framework of a European settlement.